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Tuesday, 3 December 2019

Polling round-up: the 2019 general election, week 4

This article was made possible by our Patreon supporters! Special thanks in particular go to our amazing $5 supporters: Vincent Calabrese, Scott Folan, Josuke Higashikata, Chloe Hopkins, Harry Jackson, Stephen Kaar, Bert Rothkugel, sn, Alan Spence, Alex Wilson

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--

The 2019 general election is nearly over. Just 9 days remain until Britain will vote in its 3rd election in just 4 years, continuing a journey that began with the unexpected 2015 election result and was followed by the unexpected 2016 referendum result, which itself was followed by the unexpected 2017 election result. In all three cases, most opinion polls completely failed to predict the actual result: the polls predicted a hung parliament in 2015, a victory for Remain in 2016, and a Tory majority in 2017. None of those things happened.

Week 4 of the 2019 election campaign just ended, and Labour clearly did well last week. After only increasing their vote share by 1pt in Week 2 and Week 3, Labour's average vote share in polls rose by 3pts last week. It is now averaging 33% - exactly the same as in Week 4 of the 2017 election campaign. The Tories, meanwhile, appear to have finally peaked at 43%, and are doing worse than at this point in 2017 (when they were averaging 46%).

So, without further ado, let's look at the numbers.

What the polls looked like in Week 4 (25th November-1st December)

In the week of 25th-1st December, the average of polls was (changes since the previous week): 

Tories 43% (-), Labour 33% (+3), Lib Dems 13% (-2), Brexit 4% (-), SNP 4% (-), Greens 3% (-)


According to my seat estimate, the seat result would be (changes since the previous week):

Tories 348 (-12), Labour 219 (+13), SNP 41 (-), Lib Dems 19 (-1), Others 23 (-) 

The Tories' estimated majority, which last week was 70 seats, has now fallen to 46 seats. Labour have increased their vote share and estimated seat total (the only party to do so).

The Liberal Democrats, meanwhile, have collapsed further, falling to just 13% in the polls and 19 seats in my seat estimate. It is worth bearing in mind that, 7 months ago, the Lib Dems' estimated seat total was 60 seats. It is now just 19 (-41). Amongst Remain voters, the Lib Dems have collapsed still further, whilst Labour is winning the support of almost 50% of Remainers.

Amongst Remain voters, voting intention in Week 4 of the campaign was:

Labour 48% (+4), Lib Dems 23% (-3), Tories 18% (-), SNP 5% (-), Green 3% (-1), Brexit 1% (+1)

Labour's share of the vote amongst Remainers (48%) is the party's highest in a weekly average since the week of 28th February-3rd March, whilst the Lib Dems' share of the vote (23%) is their lowest in a weekly average since 20th-26th May.

Amongst Leave voters, voting intention in Week 4 of the campaign was:

Tories 70% (+1), Labour 16% (+2), Brexit 7% (-1), Lib Dems 3% (-1), Grn 2% (+1, SNP 1% (-1)

How is Labour doing compared to this point in 2017?

MPs voted to hold the 2017 general election on 19th April 2017, so the period of time most comparable to Week 4 of the 2019 campaign was the week of 15th-21st May 2017.

At this point in 2017, Labour was averaging 33%. The Tories’ average poll lead was 13pts, and their estimated majority was 76 seats. By comparison, the Tories’ average poll lead this week was 10pts, and their estimated majority was 46 seats.

Over the following two weeks, Labour support rose steadily until the party was averaging 37%, as shown in the chart below. Labour then outperformed these polls and won 41% within Great Britain in the 2017 election.

Whilst the 2017 campaign was 1 week longer than the 2019 campaign, the final week did not make any difference to the polls; in fact, Labour's average vote share in the final week (36%) was 1pt lower than in Week 6 of the 2017 campaign (37%).


Thus far in 2019, Labour's vote share week-to-week has exactly matched its vote share week-to-week in 2017, as shown in the graph below. If this trend continues, then we should be averaging 35% by the end of this week, and 37% by 12th December. Even if the Tory vote share does not change, this should put us within 6pts of the Conservatives by election day. This would almost certainly result in a hung parliament, with the possibility of Labour becoming the largest party if the polls are slightly wrong (as they were in 2015, 2016 and 2017).


Tuesday, 26 November 2019

Polling round-up: the 2019 general election, week 3

This article was made possible by our Patreon supporters! Special thanks in particular go to our amazing $5 supporters: Vincent Calabrese, Scott Folan, Josuke Higashikata, Chloe Hopkins, Harry Jackson, Stephen Kaar, Bert Rothkugel, sn, Alan Spence, Alex Wilson

To support Stats for Lefties on Patreon, visit https://www.patreon.com/leftiestats


--

The 2019 general election is now in full swing. Both major parties have released their manifestos, the debates have begun, and the minor parties are collapsing.

The Brexit Party, in particular, has almost completely collapsed; this is partly due to the pollsters adjusting their methodology to take account of the Brexit Party's decision not to stand in the 317 seats that were won by the Tories in 2017. Unsurprisingly, the Tories have gained the most from the Brexit Party's collapse, but with 2-and-a-half weeks to go the Tories are running out of Leave votes to gain and are doing worse than at this point in 2017.

Labour's policies, meanwhile, have been recieved very positively - and its Brexit policy is actually the most popular policy of all the parties. This election is still wide open, and either major party could win. So let's take a look at the polls.

What the polls looked like in Week 3 (18th-24th November)

In the week of 18th-24th November, the average of polls was (changes since the week of 11th-17th November): 

Tories 43% (+2), Labour 30% (+1), Lib Dems 15% (-), Brexit 4% (-2), SNP 4% (+1), Greens 3% (-)


According to my seat estimate, the seat result would be (changes since the week of 4th-10th November): 

Tories 360 (+3), Labour 206 (-2), SNP 41 (-), Lib Dems 20 (-1), Others 23 (-)

The Tories’ gains last week were again almost entirely at the expense of the Brexit Party, partly because pollsters made changes to their methodology to account for the fact that the Brexit Party is not standing in the 317 seats that were won by the Tories in 2017. Overall, both major parties gained votes over the past week, and largely stood still relative to one another.

Amongst Leave voters, voting intention in 11th-17th November was, on average, as follows (changes since 4th-10th November):

Tories 69% (+2), Labour 14% (-), Brexit 8% (-3), Lib Dems 3% (-1), SNP 2% (-), Grn 2% (+1)

Amongst Remain voters, voting intention was:

Labour 44% (-), Lib Dems 26% (-), Tories 18% (-1), SNP 5% (-), Green 4% (-1)

Whilst the Tories are increasing their vote at the expense of the Brexit Party, Labour also continues to increase its support. The party is now averaging 30% in polls; in the week before MPs voted for an election, the party was averaging 23%.

The Lib Dems have not had a good week. Their average vote share in polls remains 15%, their lowest vote share in a weekly average since 20th-27th May (when they averaged 13%), and their estimated seat total has fallen to just 20 seats – which would represent a net gain of just 8 seats compared to 2017. Labour is now estimated to win 208 seats to the Lib Dems' 20.
For Jo Swinson to fulfill her ambition of becoming Prime Minister, she would now need to increase the Lib Dems' support by over 10 million votes in less than three weeks. That simply isn't going to happen. Either Boris Johnson or Jeremy Corbyn will win this election. Nobody else can.

Labour's policies are popular

Last week, Labour released its 2019 manifesto - and just like in 2017, the party's policies were recieved favourably by the public. DeltaPollUK polled the public to ask what they thought of particular policies, and these were the results:


All of the Labour policies listed in the poll had the support of a plurality of voters, and all but two (free broadband and Labour's Brexit policy) had the support of a majority of voters. The party's pledge to increase health spending by 4.3% a year is the most popular policy, winning the support of 81% of voters. Notably, its policy of raising taxes for those earning over £80,000 a year (whilst freezing taxes for everyone else) is also overwhelmingly popular.

Labour's Brexit policy, which has often been dismissed by centrists as a fudge that pleases nobody, is in fact the most popular Brexit policy out of all three major parties - and is the only policy that has more supporters than opponents.


Surprisingly, Labour's Brexit policy is actually more popular amongst Remain voters than the Liberal Democrats' pledge to revoke Article 50.


How is Labour doing compared to this point in 2017?

MPs voted to hold the 2017 general election on 19th April 2017, so the period of time most comparable to Week 3 of the 2019 campaign was the week of 8th-14th May 2017.

At this point in 2017, Labour was averaging 30%. The Tories’ average poll lead was 17pts, and their estimated majority was 110 seats. By comparison, the Tories’ average poll lead this week was 13pts, and their estimated majority was 70 seats.

Over the following few weeks, Labour support rose steadily until the party was averaging 36-37%, as shown in the chart below. Labour then outperformed these polls and won 41% within Great Britain in the 2017 election.


Summary

In last week's article, I wrote that:

"This week will see the publication of the 2019 manifesto and the Leaders’ debates, and all we need this week to continue on the 2017 trajectory is a gain of 1pt – and if the manifesto doesn’t deliver at least a 1pt increase in Labour’s vote share, I will be amazed."

Even though the manifesto usually takes about a week to affect the polls, Labour's vote share did indeed increase by 1pt this week, meaning that the party has already gained 7pts in three weeks. The party is performing just as well as it did at this point in 2017, and it is winning back Remainers at the speed of light, whilst the Tories are doing worse than they were doing at this point in 2017.

With two-and-a-half weeks left, we are closer to the Tories in the polls than we were at this point in 2017. The Lib Dems are collapsing, Remainers are flocking to the Labour Party, and the Tories have maxed out their Leave vote whilst alienating Lib Dem-leaning Tory Remainers.

Monday, 25 November 2019

Remainers aren’t voting for the Lib Dems: they now support Labour

This article was made possible by our Patreon supporters! Special thanks in particular go to our amazing $5 supporters: Vincent Calabrese, Scott Folan, Josuke Higashikata, Chloe Hopkins, Harry Jackson, Stephen Kaar, Bert Rothkugel, sn, Alan Spence, Alex Wilson

To support Stats for Lefties on Patreon, visit https://www.patreon.com/leftiestats


--

We are the party of Remain”, said Jo Swinson when she was elected as Leader of the Liberal Democrats in June 2019.

But Remainers don’t seem to agree.

Ever since the 2019 general election began, the Liberal Democrats – running on a manifesto pledge to revoke Article 50 – have been rapidly losing the support of Remain voters, with Remainers overwhelmingly rallying behind the Labour Party’s second referendum policy as the best and most credible way to stop Brexit. Let’s take a look at the numbers.

1) Remainers support Labour’s Brexit policy

In a poll conducted on 21-23 November, DeltaPollUK found that more Remain voters support Labour's policy of holding a referendum on a renegotiated Brexit than support revoking Article 50.



Furthermore, in September 2019, YouGov asked voters in a poll how they would feel if Labour supported particular policies on Brexit. Amongst Remain voters, 59% said that they would feel delighted/pleased if Labour adopted a policy of holding a referendum on a renegotiated Brexit deal; just 17% said that they would be disappointed/angry.

2) Remainers support Labour now, not the Lib Dems

Following the European Elections, in which the Liberal Democrats came second with 20%, Remain voters increasingly began to support the Lib Dems in opinion polls. This support reached its highest in the week of 23rd-29th September, when 38% of Remain voters said that they would vote Lib Dem – a 4pt lead over the Labour Party. The following weeks saw Labour and the Lib Dems tied for first place amongst Remainers.


But once the 2019 general election begun, Remainers began to rally behind the Labour Party; Labour’s support amongst Remainers (44%) is now at its highest since the week of 8th-14th April (when it was 48%).


In the past four weeks, Labour’s support amongst Remainers has risen from 34% to 44% (+10). With two-and-a-half weeks left before polling day, and with Labour’s support amongst Remainers rising by an average of 3pts per week, it is looking increasingly likely that Labour will equal (or even surpass) its 2017 vote share of 55% with Remainers.

So much for the idea that Remainers will never vote for Corbyn!

3) Remainers are liking Corbyn more and more, and Swinson less and less

In the week before MPs voted to hold the 2019 election (21st-27th October) Jo Swinson had an average net approval rating with Remain voters of +13pts, whilst Corbyn had an average net approval rating of -30pts. In the weeks since then, this gap has narrowed. Here’s Corbyn’s average approval rating amongst Remainers over time


Meanwhile, here is Jo Swinson’s approval rating amongst Remainers:


Swinson’s net approval rating has fallen from +13pts to +7pts in just a few weeks, whilst Corbyn’s net approval rating has risen from -30pts to -15pts.

After this week’s TV debate between Boris Johnson and Jeremy Corbyn, meanwhile, Remainers were very positive about Corbyn. According to a YouGov poll of voters who watched the debate, amongst Remain voters:

-> 82% thought that Corbyn came across as more in touch with ordinary people

-> 77% thought that Jeremy Corbyn performed best overall

-> 73% thought that Corbyn came across as more trustworthy

-> 60% thought that Corbyn came across as more likeable

-> By a 16pt margin, they thought that Corbyn came across as more Prime Ministerial

-> By a 6pt margin, they thought that Corbyn performed best during the Brexit section of the debate

Conclusion

In this context, the argument that the Lib Dems are now the tactical vote choice in strongly pro-Remain areas is beginning to look very outdated. Remainers are overwhelmingly supporting the Labour Party now, not the Lib Dems; and rightly so, as only Labour can actually deliver a People’s Vote and give Britain the opportunity to remain in the European Union.

In 88% of the most marginal seats that were won by the Tories in 2017, Labour came second; Labour is currently averaging 30% in polls to the Lib Dems' 15%; most Remainers support the Labour Party, not the Liberal Democrats; and more Remainers prefer the Labour Party's Brexit policy than prefer the Lib Dems' Brexit policy.

All the available evidence shows that Labour is the party of Remain - not the Lib Dems.
If you're a Remainer, the choice is clear: either we leave the EU with Boris Johnson, or have a 2nd referendum with Jeremy Corbyn. There is no other possible outcome. The choice is yours.

Monday, 18 November 2019

Polling round-up: the 2019 general election, week 2

This article was made possible by our Patreon supporters! Special thanks in particular go to our amazing $5 supporters: Vincent Calabrese, Scott Folan, Josuke Higashikata, Chloe Hopkins, Harry Jackson, Stephen Kaar, Bert Rothkugel, sn, Alan Spence, Alex Wilson

To support Stats for Lefties on Patreon, visit https://www.patreon.com/leftiestats


--

The 2019 general election is underway! The Labour manifesto will be announced this week, and the Leaders’ debates are about to begin. This week will be very important. But for now, let's look at last week's polls.

Unsurprisingly, the Brexit Party’s decision to stand down in seats that the Tories won in 2017 led to the Conservatives gaining in the polls, but Labour gained votes too, and the Tories are still doing worse than at this point in 2017.

Centrists are once again trying to label Corbyn as unelectable before a single vote has even been cast. But they’re wrong.

What the polls looked like in Week 2 (11th-17th November)

In the week of 11th-17th November, the average of polls was (changes since the week of 4-10 November):

Tories 41% (+3), Labour 29% (+1), Lib Dems 15% (-1), Brexit 6% (-3), SNP 3% (-1), Greens 3% (-)


According to my seat estimate, the seat result would be (changes since the week of 4th-10th November):

Tories 357 (+19), Labour 208 (-11), SNP 41 (-3), Lib Dems 21 (-5), Others 23 (-)

The Tories’ gains this week have been almost entirely at the expense of the Brexit Party, partly because pollsters have made changes to their methodology to account for the fact that the Brexit Party is not standing in the 317 seats that were won by the Tories in 2017. Amongst Leave voters, voting intention in 11th-17th November was, on average, as follows (changes since 4th-10th November):

Tories 67% (+7), Labour 14% (+1), Brexit 11% (-7), Lib Dems 4% (-), SNP 2% (-), Grn 1% (-1)

Amongst Remain voters, voting intention was:

Labour 44% (+3), Lib Dems 26% (-3), Tories 19% (+1), SNP 5% (-), Green 5% (+1)

Whilst the Tories are increasing their vote at the expense of the Brexit Party, Labour also continues to increase its support – in Labour’s case, at the expense of the Lib Dems.

The Lib Dems have not had a good week. Their average vote share in polls has fallen to 15%, their lowest vote share in a weekly average since 20th-27th May (when they averaged 13%), and their estimated seat total has fallen to just 21 seats – which would represent a net gain of just 9 seats compared to 2017.

This is a massive loss of support for the Lib Dems. Just a few months ago, they seemed to be on the verge of a breakthrough. In the week of 10th-16th June, the Lib Dems were averaging 21% in polls and their seat estimate was 60 seats (they won 12 seats in 2017). Their support has now collapsed, and the party is losing more and more Remain voters every week, as the chart below demonstrates.


How is Labour doing compared to this point in 2017? 

MPs voted to hold the 2017 general election on 19th April 2017, so the period of time most comparable to Week 2 of the 2019 campaign was the week of 1st-7th May 2017.

At this point in 2017, Labour was averaging 29%. The Tories’ average poll lead was 18pts, and their estimated majority was 116 seats. By comparison, the Tories’ average poll lead this week was 12pts, and their estimated majority was 64 seats.

Over the following few weeks, Labour support rose steadily until the party was averaging 36-37%, as shown in the chart below. Labour then outperformed these polls and won 41% within Great Britain in the 2017 election.


What is notable about the 2017 campaign is that, whilst Labour’s support rose significantly over the course of the campaign (+10pts) it never rose by more than 3pts (on average) in any particular week. Indeed, aside from the week of 15-21 May 2017, Labour’s support never rose by more than 2pts.

Therefore, even if we are on course for another 2017-style Labour resurgence, we should not expect to see significant changes in any particular week. In fact, Labour’s gains in the week of 11th-17th November (+1pt) are exactly what we should be expecting to see if Labour’s 2017 gains are being repeated.

Summary

In short, Labour is gaining in the polls every week. It has gained 6pts in just three weeks, it is performing just as well as it did at this point in 2017, and it is winning back Remainers at the speed of light.

All in all, last week went okay. The Brexit Party’s decision to stand aside in seats won by the Tories in 2017 unsurprisingly led to an increase in the Tories’ vote share, but Labour’s vote has also increased. This week will see the publication of the 2019 manifesto and the Leaders’ debates, and all we need this week to continue on the 2017 trajectory is a gain of 1pt – and if the manifesto doesn’t deliver at least a 1pt increase in Labour’s vote share, I will be amazed.

Wednesday, 13 November 2019

Polling round-up: the 2019 general election, week 1

This article was made possible by our Patreon supporters! Special thanks in particular go to our amazing $5 supporters: Vincent Calabrese, Scott Folan, Josuke Higashikata, Chloe Hopkins, Harry Jackson, Stephen Kaar, sn, Alan Spence, Alex Wilson

To support Stats for Lefties on Patreon, visit https://www.patreon.com/leftiestats


--
 
The 2019 general election has begun. With Parliament unwilling to pass his Brexit deal by his self-imposed deadline of October 31st, Prime Minister Boris Johnson called for a general election, and the Labour Party agreed.

The campaign has begun – and this time, Labour can win.

Let’s take a look at what the polls looked like just before the election began, and what’s changed over the past week (4th-10th November).

What the polls looked like before the election

In the week before Parliament voted for an early general election, the Tories had good reason to feel confident about winning a snap election. In the week of 21st-27th October, their poll lead was impressive: they led Labour by 15pts, which on a universal swing would result in a Conservative majority of 74 seats – the biggest Conservative majority since 1987.


However, this has rapidly changed.

What the polls look like now

In the two weeks since then, Labour has rapidly improved its share of the vote, whilst the Tories’ share of the vote (38%) has not changed.


In 14 days, Labour’s average vote share has risen from 23% to 28%, a change driven largely by gains amongst Remain voters. In the week of 21st-27th October, voting intention amongst Remain voters was:

Labour 34%, Lib Dem 33%, Tories 18%, Green 7%, SNP 6% 

But by the week of 4th-10th November, this had shifted to:

Labour 41% (+7), Lib Dem 29% (-4), Tories 18% (-), SNP 6% (-), Green 5% (-2) 

Labour has also increased its vote share amongst Leave voters from 10% to 13%.

As a result of these Labour gains, the Tories’ lead has fallen from 15pts to 10pts after just two weeks. The overall changes are:

Tories 38% (-), Labour 28% (+5), Lib Dem 16% (-2), Brexit 9% (-2), SNP 4% (-), Green 3% (-1)

As a result, the Tories’ estimated majority has substantially declined. In the week of 4th-10th November, the Tories’ estimated majority was just 28 seats – down from 74 seats just two weeks ago.

It is worth bearing in mind that, at a similar stage in the 2017 election campaign, the Tories’ estimated majority was an astonishing 114 seats. They went on to lose their majority just 5 weeks later.

How is Labour doing compared to this point in 2017?

MPs voted to hold the 2017 general election on 19th April 2017, so the period of time most comparable to Week 1 of the 2019 campaign was the week of 24th-30th April 2017. At this point in 2017, Labour was averaging 28%. The Tories’ average poll lead was 18pts, and their estimated majority was 114 seats.

Over the following few weeks, Labour support rose steadily, as shown in the chart below.


What is notable about the 2017 campaign is that, whilst Labour’s support rose significantly over the course of the campaign, it never rose by more than 3pts (on average) in any particular week. Indeed, aside from the week of 15-21 May 2017, Labour’s support never rose by more than 2pts. Therefore, even if we are on course for another 2017-style Labour resurgence, we should not expect to see significant changes in any particular week.

Instead, as long as Labour’s support is consistently rising by 2-3pts every single week, we should be in a very good position to win on December 12th.

Saturday, 28 September 2019

Stats for Lefties: International Edition!

This article was made possible by our Patreon supporters! Special thanks in particular go to our amazing $5 supporters: Vincent Calabrese, Scott Folan, Josuke Higashikata, Chloe Hopkins, Harry Jackson, Stephen Kaar, sn, Alan Spence, Alex Wilson

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For this article, I've decided to take a look at upcoming elections in other countries!

There are three countries with Parliamentary elections in October and November that will likely be of interest to leftists in Britain:
  • Portugal (6th October), where centre-left Socialist Prime Minister Antonio Costa is seeking to win a majority for his Socialist minority government
  • Canada (21st October), where Liberal Prime Minister Justin Trudeau is seeking to win a second term, and the centre-left New Democratic Party (NDP) are seeking to rebuild their support after a disappointing 2015 election
  • Spain (10th November), where centre-left Socialist Prime Minister Pedro Sanchez is seeking to win a majority for his Socialist minority government

Portugal (6th October)

Following the 2015 election in Portugal, a minority coalition government composed of the conservative Social Democratic Party and CDS-People’s Party was formed. But after this government failed to win a motion of No Confidence, centre-left PM Antonio Costa took power instead.

Costa, leader of the Socialist Party (PS), has reversed austerity, halted planned privatisations and raised the minimum wage. The PS minority government has been supported in Parliament by two smaller leftist parties – the Left Bloc (BE) and the Unitary Democratic Coalition (CDU). In October, the electorate will get the chance to decide if they want to keep their anti-austerity PS government.

As well as the two previously mentioned conservative parties, the environmentalist People-Animals-Nature party (PAN) and the newly-founded conservative Alliance party (A) will also be seeking to win seats. In 2015, the PSD and CDS-PP stood together in an electoral alliance called “Portugal Ahead”; of the 107 MPs they won, 89 were members of the PSD and 18 were members of the CDS-PP. This alliance is not being repeated in October.

Monthly poll averages for Portugal's 2019 general election.

The table above shows monthly average of Portuguese opinion polls in 2019 thus far. As only 1 poll was conducted in August, no average is provided for August. The Socialist Party (PS) has a clear lead (13pts in September thus far), with the Left Bloc (BE) and CDU unchanged from their 2015 result. PAN is doing well, polling 4% in September, up from the 1.4% they achieved in the 2015 election.

The conservative parties are doing poorly, however. The PSD and CDS-PP, having won a combined 39% of the vote in 2015, have lost a great deal of support. The PSD is now averaging just 25% in polls, with the CDS-PP averaging just 5%. Alliance, meanwhile, after averaging around 2-3% earlier this year, has dropped to just 1% in polls and looks unlikely to win any seats.

Monthly seat estimates based on monthly poll averages for Portugal's 2019 general election.

The table above shows seat estimates based on those poll averages. 116 seats are needed for a majority. If current polling was repeated in an election, the PS would fall 6 seats short of an overall majority, winning 110 seats (+24). The Left Bloc would win 20 seats (+1), their best result ever, whilst the CDU would win 16 seats (-1), the same as in 2011. The PSD would win just 74 seats (-15), the party’s lowest share of seats (32.2%) since 1983, whilst the CDS-PP would collapse to just 6 seats, their worst result since 1991.

Portugal uses a system of proportional representation to elect its MPs. There are 20 constituencies, with varying numbers of MPs (ranging from 47 for Lisbon to 2 for Portalegre). In addition to this, there are 2 seats elected by Portuguese citizens living elsewhere in Europe and 2 seats elected by Portuguese citizens living elsewhere in the world. Each constituency allocates its seats through the D’hondt calculation, which broadly allocates seats in proportion to a party’s share of the vote.

As the PSD and CDS-PP stood as a single alliance in 2015, but are not doing so in 2019, I have calculated an estimate of what each party's vote share might have been in each constituency if they had stood seperately. This estimate is based on the three constituencies where they did stand against each other in 2015. In these seats, the PSD won an average of 88.2% of the combined PSD/CDS-PP vote, and the CDS-PP won an average of 11.8%.

My estimated 2015 vote share for the PSD in each constituency is thus 88.2% of the votes won by Portugal Ahead in that same constituency, and the estimated 2015 vote share for the CDS-PP is 11.8% of the votes won by Portugal Ahead. This is not ideal, but I think that it is the best that I can do.

Canada (21st October)

Since 2015, Canada has been governed by a Liberal Party majority government, led by centrist Prime Minister Justin Trudeau. Trudeau’s victory in 2015 was a remarkable achievement for the Liberals, given that in 2011 the party had dropped to third place (behind the centre-left New Democratic Party). In 2015, Trudeau increased the Liberals’ vote share by 20.6pts and gained 148 seats. In 2019, the party will be seeking to keep their majority.

Monthly poll averages for the 2019 Canadian general election.

The table above shows poll averages in Canada since the start of 2019. The Conservatives currently have a 1pt over the Liberals, with the centre-left New Democratic Party (NDP) in third place and the centrist Green Party in fourth place. The Bloc Quebecois, who support independence for Quebec, are in fifth.

So what would that mean in terms of seats? Canada, like the UK, uses “First Past The Post” to elect their 338 MPs. As a result, my Canada seat estimate uses the same methodology as my UK seat estimate: applying the gain/loss for each party to that party’s vote share in every seat.

Monthly seat estimates based on monthly poll averages for the 2019 Canadian general election.

As you can see, the Liberals’ share of seats has declined since the start of the year, and Canada looks set to elect its first Hung Parliament since 2008. This is not, however, particularly unusual for Canada; of the 23 Canadian elections held from 1945 to 2015, a total of ten (43%) resulted in hung parliaments. For comparison, of the 19 UK elections held from 1945 to 2015, just two (10%) resulted in hung parliaments.

Spain (10th November)

Since June 2018, Spain has been run by a minority Socialist government led by centre-left Prime Minister Pedro Sanchez. Like Costa in Portugal, Sanchez came to power following a vote of No Confidence in the governing conservative party (the People's Party in Spain). But unlike Costa, Sanchez’s position in Parliament was very fragile. When he became PM, Sanchez’s party (the PSOE) only held 84 seats out of 350 (24%); this would be equivalent to Labour trying to form a government with just 156 MPs.

When Sanchez's budget failed in early 2019, he called a snap election, which was held in April 2019. Although the PSOE won the most votes and seats in that election (gaining 2.1m votes and 38 seats), they fell 53 seats short of a majority and have been unable to form a workable coalition, leading to the November snap election. This is the first time since 1872 that two Spanish general elections have been held in the same year.

Monthly poll averages for the November 2019 Spanish general election.

The table above shows monthly poll averages since the April 2019 election. As you can see, the PSOE and People’s Party have made gains at the expense of the smaller parties; the PP in particular, which was nearly outpolled by the centrist Citizens (C’s) party in April, is now averaging 20% (+3pts).

Monthly seat estimates for Spain's election based on monthly average of polls.

However, the PSOE’s hopes for a majority do not look set to be fulfilled. If current polling was repeated in an election, the PSOE and the left-wing Unidos Podemos (UP) would have a combined 167 seats – nine seats short of the 176 seats needed for a majority. In order to form a centre-left government, Sanchez would also need the support of the Republican Left of Catalonia (ERC), a left-wing party that supports independence for the region of Catalonia. No other viable government could be formed. This is a change from May 2019, where the polls indicated that the PSOE (144 seats) and Podemos (36 seats) could have formed a governing coalition if an election was held in that month.

Summary

So, in summary:
  • The Socialist minority government in Portugal is almost certainly going to win again;
  • The Canadian Liberals are tied with the Conservatives, whilst the centre-left NDP is set to lose seats and achieve its worst result since 2004;
  • The polls are getting worse for the Socialist minority government in Spain, and another inconclusive result looks set to be the outcome of Spain's third snap election in three years.

Wednesday, 14 August 2019

“I Don't Want to Set the World on Fire”: What do the public think about Brexit?

This article was made possible by our Patreon supporters! 

Special thanks in particular go to our amazing $5 supporters: Vincent Calabrese, Scott Folan, Chloe Hopkins, Stephen Kaar, Henry Ellenger, Harry Jackson, sn and Alex Wilson

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With two months left until we are scheduled to leave the European Union – with or without a deal – the question of what the voters want to do about Brexit is a key question. However, different people have many different interpretations of what the public actually thinks. The Telegraph claimed earlier this year that “Every region of England and Wales happy to leave the EU without a deal - except London if extension refused”; one prominent Remain campaigner, meanwhile, claimed that Leave voters don’t support No Deal. But what do the numbers say? And what does this tell us about how a potential second EU referendum might go? Let’s take a look.

“Maybe”: would the public vote Leave again?

After the 2016 referendum, pollsters began asking voters how they would vote in a re-run of that “Remain” / “Leave” referendum. They continue to ask this question (which I like to call the “generic” referendum question) today. Sometimes the question varies slightly (YouGov often asks voters whether they think Britain was “right” or “wrong” to vote Leave, which I think counts), but all of the pollsters’ questions amount to the same query – would you support Leave or Remain in a referendum?

The table below shows average of such “generic” referendum polls in each month since January 2016.



As you can see, for the past three years, “Leave” and “Remain” have been stuck in a virtual tie, with each side being within the margin of error of the other. Leave has not led in the polls, on average, in any month since the 2017 general election; but the lead for Remain has been shaky at best, with Remain never polling above 54% (an 8pt lead) and never achieving a double-digit lead. Not even the chaos of March 2019, when we failed to leave the EU on the designated date, shifted the numbers to any great degree; support for remaining in the EU was exactly the same in April (54%) as it was in March (54%).

Of course, those of us who wish to remain in the EU (which includes myself) would take solace from the fact that Remain has been consistently ahead since March 2018. But as I have argued before, it is highly likely that Remain would lose support during a referendum campaign, which means that we would need a significant pre-referendum poll lead to even win by a normal margin when votes are cast. For example, in March 2016, “Remain” was averaging 52% in polls; on 23 June 2016, “Remain” only won 48.1%, a loss of 4 percentage points over the course of 3 months. If that happens again, Remain’s current 6pt lead would no longer exist, and we would lose again.

So, in short, Remain is ahead on the generic referendum question and has been consistently ahead for over a year; but Remain’s lead is narrow and we should avoid taking a “Remain” win for granted.

“Anything goes”: what if the Leave option wasn’t just one vague word? How would the public vote then?

We have plenty of polling about how the public would vote in a re-run of the 2016 referendum, but we have frustratingly little polling about the two scenarios that are actually likely: a referendum where the “Leave” option is May’s Deal, and a referendum where the “Leave” option is No Deal. But in this section, I’ll look at how the public might vote in those hypothetical referenda.

Most of the available polling that offers a specific Leave option looks at support for Theresa May’s Brexit deal, which is still the only Brexit deal that has been negotiated. The table below shows monthly averages of polls that offered the option of “Remain” and May’s Deal.



May’s Deal is thus less popular in practice than the generic concept of “Leave”; polls in July showed Remain 18pts ahead of May’s Deal. This lead has expanded over time; as recently as April, May’s Deal was averaging 45%, just 1pt less than the generic concept of “Leave”. The levels of support have since diverged, however; May’s Deal is now 7pts less popular than “Leave”. One poll from BMG Research showed “Remain” 26pts ahead of May’s Deal when Don’t Knows were excluded.

So what about leaving with No Deal?



As you can see, support for “No Deal” in July (46%) was almost identical to support for a generic “Leave” option (47%). This is a significant change from last year – in October 2018, “No Deal” averaged just 41% in polls compared to 47% for a generic “Leave” option. One poll in July showed “Remain” on 52% and No Deal on 48%.

In short, we don’t have much polling on specific Leave options, but what we do know is that No Deal fares better against “Remain” than May’s Deal does. Hopefully more polling will be conducted on this question soon.

“Happy Times”: what do the public want to do next on Brexit?

The question of what should happen next with Brexit is a rather different question to how people might vote in a hypothetical referendum. After all, some voters might favour Remain but don’t think that reversing Brexit is the right thing to do. So let’s look at voters’ attitudes to possible Brexit outcomes.

Opinium frequently polls voters asking them to choose between 3 options for Brexit:

-> Going ahead with Brexit on the current timelines even if it means leaving with ‘no deal’"

-> Revoking Article 50 and remaining in the European Union

-> Delaying Article 50 until we have a greater idea of what Brexit would get the most support

The table below shows the results of these polls. YouGov also asked a virtually identical question on 1st April, so I have included that in the table as well.



Since the beginning of 2019, support for going ahead with Brexit even if it means leaving with No Deal has risen from 39% (February) to 45% (July). This 6pt gain for “No Deal” has been accompanied by a rise in support for cancelling Article 50 – but only a 2pt rise. Overall, voters have become polarised on the question of what to do next; support for delaying Article 50 has fallen from 20% in February to 13% in July.

However, these polls didn’t include the option of holding a referendum. So let’s look at the recent polls on that question!

The table below shows the average of polls conducted on the question of a second referendum since the start of 2019. I have only included polls that made clear that Remain would be an option on the ballot, as that is the primary demand of the People’s Vote campaign.



Support for a second referendum has begun to rise within the past two months; in July, the average of polls (excluding Don’t Knows) shows that a narrow majority of voters now support holding a second EU referendum.

“Jolly Days”: conclusion

So what can we conclude from this data?

Well, firstly, the polls show that the public has not turned against Brexit to any great extent. Remain leads in generic referendum polls and is ahead of May’s Deal and No Deal. But, with the exception of May’s Deal, the Remain lead remains narrow and precarious. This polarisation is echoed when it comes to the question of whether voters want a second EU referendum; in July, polls showed that voters favour it by 51%-49%; in May, voters were evenly divided on the question. 3 years of Brexit debate has barely shifted public opinion on the question of whether we should or should not leave the EU, and it does not look as if anything will significantly change this deadlock by October 31st.

Secondly, No Deal is more likely to defeat “Remain” in a referendum than May’s Deal. One poll in July even showed “No Deal” on a worryingly high 48% - the same percentage that “Leave” was averaging in polls in March 2016. Remainers cannot afford to be relaxed, as Vince Cable is, about the idea of No Deal being on the ballot in any future referendum. There is a distinct possibility that Remain could lose again, and if No Deal wins, there will be absolutely no hope left for the Remain cause. Remainers should strongly oppose any efforts to place "No Deal" on the ballot of a 2nd referendum.

Finally, all of this data shows that there are no easy or popular answers to the Brexit crisis. The public are evenly divided on the question of whether Brexit is right or wrong, and it is difficult to see how any Brexit outcome could satisfy significant numbers of people on both sides.

There is much to be debated about how we got to this point. Maybe the voters wouldn’t be so polarised if more Remainers had accepted the result; maybe Remainers wouldn’t have been as energised if Leavers had actually tried to include them in the Brexit process; maybe things would be different if a Labour government had won in 2017, as they would have avoided the incompetent shambles that Theresa May produced.

But with the UK just two months away from a No Deal Brexit, it seems to me that it’s impossible to know with any certainty that a particular Brexit position will solve everything or unite the country. All anyone can do right now is advocate for what they think is right in principle - whether that's leaving or remaining.

And as I’ve said before, when it comes to what Labour should do, that means advocating clearly for Remain.

Thursday, 23 May 2019

D’hondt go breaking my heart: final EU election poll average

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Well, the unexpected European Elections are finally here. After her Brexit deal failed to pass the House of Commons, and then failed again, and then failed again, Theresa May was forced to delay Brexit until October. And so here we are, electing MEPs to a Parliament that we may not even be a part of in a year’s time.

Unsurprisingly, that uncertainty over whether our MEPs will even take their seats has led to some uncertainty over how people are going to vote. Fortunately, plenty of polls have been conducted to give us a sense of how people are going to vote.

So far in 2019, 39 opinion polls have been published asking voters how they’d vote in the European elections. The table below shows averages of polls in each week leading up to the European elections. Note that only 1 poll was conducted in the week of 29th April-5th May.



And here’s my weekly seat estimate based on those poll averages:



As you can see, the polls have changed a lot in the past month. In early April, Labour was in first place, leading the Tories by 12pts; UKIP and the Brexit Party were averaging a joint 24%, but it was split evenly between the two parties; the Lib Dems were averaging 9% (up by just 2pts compared to 2014) and the Greens were averaging 6%, less than in 2014. Change UK was tied in last place with the SNP, with the two parties on 5% each.

Almost all of that has now changed. In the week of the election, my poll average now shows the Brexit Party 14pts ahead of Labour and set to win 34% of the popular vote, the best result for any party since 1994. UKIP has totally collapsed and could well end up winning a mere 3%. Change UK have declined slightly to 4%. The Lib Dems have increased their vote share by 8pts to 17% and are now neck-and-neck with Labour, who have fallen to 19%. The Greens are doing slightly better than in early April, but are only estimated to win 8% of the vote (the same as in 2014).


So what does this mean for seats?

On a universal swing, including this would lead to the Brexit Party winning 31 MEPs (42.5%), the best result for any party since 1994 (and the best result for any party ever under proportional representation).*

Labour would lose 4 MEPs, falling to 16 seats (21.9%), the 3rd-worst result for Labour in a European Parliament election (after 2009 and 1979). The Lib Dems would win 10 seats, their highest share of seats (13.7%) since 1999, whilst the Tories would collapse to just 7 seats (9.6%), their worst-ever result. The Greens would lose seats, winning 2 MEPs (-1). As very few polls have been conducted in Scotland or Wales, I have chosen to apply a universal swing to those nations too, which suggests that the SNP would win 2 seats and Plaid Cymru would win 1. However, we shouldn't rule out the possibility that the SNP could win 3 of Scotland's 6 seats.


But what about the Remain/Leave balance? Well, it depends upon how one defines it. If one defines the parties by what sort of Brexit they prefer, we get the following:

  • 37% ~ No Deal (Brexit Party/UKIP)
  • 33% ~ No Brexit (Lib Dems/Greens/SNP/Change UK/Plaid Cymru)
  • 19% ~ Labour Brexit (Labour)
  • 11% ~ May's Deal (Conservatives)

    If one defines the parties by whether their official policy position is for Brexit or not, we get the following:

    • 67% ~ For Brexit
    • 33% ~ Against Brexit

    In short, the Brexit Party is set to win, Labour and the Lib Dems are neck-and-neck, and pro-Brexit parties are set to win a majority of the popular vote.

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    *Although the Tories won more seats in 1999 (36 seats), this was a lower share of seats (41.1%) because the UK had 14 more MEPs at the time than it does today.

    Wednesday, 17 April 2019

    Will Change UK and the Brexit Party shake up the EU elections? D'hondt be so sure

    This article was made possible by our Patreon supporters! Special thanks in particular go to our $5 supporters: Harry Jackson, Henry Ellenger and Scott Folan. To support Stats for Lefties on Patreon, visit https://www.patreon.com/leftiestats
     
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    With the news that the Conservative Party has begun selecting candidates for the European elections, it’s now looking like a certainty that the UK will indeed be holding elections to the European Parliament. Many Conservatives are dreading the prospect, with Tory Minister Nadhim Zahawi calling the elections an “existential threat” to the Tories. Backbench Tory MP Mark Francois, meanwhile, believes that Nigel Farage’s new Brexit Party are “licking their lips” at the prospect of fighting European elections. On the other side of the Brexit debate, Change UK – the party that is being established by members of the Independent Group of MPs – is hoping to win votes from Remainers. 

    With the elections conducted under a voting system that ensures parties broadly receive the same share of seats as their share of the vote, Change UK's confidence would seem to be well-placed. However, the United Kingdom’s voting system for the European Parliament is not fully proportional, and the new minor parties may find themselves struggling to gain even a handful of seats. 

    The UK’s voting system 

    Members of the European Parliament (MEPs), who co-write EU laws and appoint the President of the European Commission, are elected in the UK using a system of proportional representation (PR) known as “Party List PR”. Rather than nominating 1 candidate in a relatively small area, political parties nominate a long list of candidates in super-sized constituencies that elect 3-10 MEPs dependent upon population. Voters can then vote for the party they want, and the seats in that constituency are allocated to each party in proportion to their share of the vote, using a calculation known as the "d'hondt" equation.

    The effect on minor parties 

    All uses of proportional representation in Britain have tended, over time, to produce better results for smaller parties. The EU elections themselves are a good example of this. Before 1999, European elections in Britain used first-past-the-post, just like elections to the House of Commons; the chart below shows the % vote share in EU elections for minor parties (i.e. other than Labour, the Conservatives and Lib Dems) from 1979-2014. Because Northern Ireland has a different party system, the figures below are for Great Britain only.


    The increasing prominence of minor parties in EU elections becomes even clearer when you look at the % of seats won by minor parties; this reached an all-time high in 2014, when parties other than Labour, the Conservatives and Lib Dems won 43% of MEPs. That’s the percentage equivalent of minor parties winning over 280 seats in Parliament.


    One thing that you may have noticed, however, is that until 2014 minor parties tended to receive a lot less seats than their aggregate vote share would suggest, even after the introduction of proportional representation. In 2009, for example, 42.9% of voters cast a ballot for a minor party – but minor parties only won 27.5% of the seats. In 2014, this trend was brought to a sudden end, and the proportion of votes cast for minor parties (43.8%) very closely matched the share of seats that they received (42.9%).

    The reason for this was simple: prior to 2014, most votes for minor parties were scattered across dozens of different small parties (in 2009, a total of 8 small parties received more than 1% of the popular vote). In 2014, however, most of the votes cast for minor parties were cast for 1 minor party in particular: UKIP.

    This phenomenon, whereby minor parties do relatively badly in European elections despite the use of a proportional voting system, is what I’ll explore below.

    Proportional, yet not proportional 

    Ironically, the proportional voting system used for the European Parliament has often disadvantaged minor parties (relative to their vote share). This has happened because the voting system is not strictly “proportional”. If it was, the Lib Dems’ vote share of 7% would have led to them winning 5 MEPs (7%) in 2014. Instead, they won just 1 MEP. This was because their vote share was so low in every constituency that they didn’t have enough votes to elect an MEP outside of South East England, which has the most MEPs available.

    The Green Party of England and Wales frequently faces the same problem: despite winning 8% of the popular vote in 2009 (their highest since 1989), and gaining 274,000 votes (+2.4pts) their total seats (2 MEPs) did not change. This was because, outside of London and South East England, there simply were not enough seats available in the other regions for the party to win.

    In the East of England, for example, the party won a reasonably high 8.8% of the vote; in the South East (10 seats), this would have been enough to elect 1 MEP. However, the East of England only had 7 MEPs available, so the Greens fell short. This story was repeated across the country, and for other parties. In the North East of England in 2014, for example, the Conservative Party received 17.7% of the vote; that would have guaranteed it at least 1 seat in London (8 MEPs) or the South East (10 MEPs). But the North East only had 3 MEPs, so the Tories got no seats at all.

    The table below shows the average minimum % of the vote required in 1999-2014 to elect an MEP in each region and nation of the UK.

    As you can see, the average minimum winning percentage ranges from 7.9% in South East England (10 MEPs) to 23% in North East England (3 MEPs). The fewer MEPs a constituency has, the harder it is for a minor party to win seats. And unfortunately for minor parties, most of the UK’s constituencies don’t have many MEPs.

    The consequence is that, despite European elections using proportional representation, major political parties end up winning a share of seats that is often far higher than their share of the vote. In 2009, for example, the Conservatives won 28% of the popular vote in Great Britain, but won 25 of 69 seats (38%).

    So what does this mean for Change UK and the Brexit Party?

    Effect on Change UK and the Brexit Party

    As we have seen above, unless a political party wins 10-15% of the vote in multiple regions, it is unlikely to win more than 1-2 seats across the UK. This is enough of a challenge for the Greens, who as a centre-left, environmentalist, pro-EU party at least have a unique selling point in elections. But for single-issue anti/pro-Brexit parties like Change UK and The Brexit Party, reaching this threshold is going to be hard. There are already other parties (the Lib Dems and UKIP) who appeal to the same voters, and if all of them stand in the same region, none of them could reach the threshold needed to win a seat. Indeed, in Wales and Scotland there will be 4 anti-Brexit parties competing against each other! 

    This isn’t just speculation on my part. So far, four voting intention polls for the European Elections have been published. An average of the four produces the following results:


     As we saw earlier, the European elections electoral system can produce a result for the major parties that isn’t as proportional as one might expect.


    In this instance, Labour would win 27 seats out of 70 (39%) on a vote share of just 28%. The pro-Remain parties, meanwhile (the Lib Dems, SNP, Green Party, Change UK and Plaid Cymru) would win a combined 26% of the popular vote, but only win 8 seats out of 70 (11%).

    The pro-Brexit parties would do much better, winning a combined 27% of the vote and a near-proportional 29% of the seats. But even they could do much better as a united bloc; the joint Brexit Party/UKIP vote would be enough to deliver 34% of seats if their vote wasn't split.

    So how does this happen? Once again, it’s all about the constituencies. Take this example from the Yorkshire and the Humber constituency:


    In this instance, Labour would win 3 of the 6 seats in Yorkshire and the Humber (50%), despite only winning 32% of the vote in the region. This is largely because the anti-Brexit vote would be split 3 ways; thus, despite winning a collective 20% of the vote in that region (enough for 1 seat) none of the anti-Brexit parties would win anything.

    The West Midlands is another good example. Despite being projected to win only 29.3% of the vote, Labour would win 3 out of 7 seats (42.9%). The anti-Brexit parties would collectively win 17% of the vote (enough for 1 MEP) but because they would split the vote three ways, they would win nothing. The pro-Brexit parties, meanwhile, would win a joint 31% of the vote, enough to deliver them 3 seats - but because the pro-Brexit vote would be split, they would only end up with 2 MEPs.



    Conclusion 

    The Brexit Party and Change UK will likely poll well in the European elections. Polls suggest that the Brexit Party is averaging around 16%, a very strong showing for a party created just a few months ago. Change UK, meanwhile, is doing worse, averaging around 5%.

    There is no doubt that the two parties will affect the results of the European elections. But if no electoral pacts are formed, then the number of seats won by these two parties could be surprisingly low, simply because they will be splitting the vote of other parties with nearly-identical positions on Brexit.

    All of this could change, of course. The parties could well form electoral pacts, or their popularity could increase as we get closer to the elections. But what this data shows is that the voting system for European elections has its own obstacles, just like first-past-the-post – and it would be wrong to assume that the new minor parties will find the European elections very easy just because they use proportional representation. Politics is never that simple!