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With two months left until we are scheduled to leave the European Union – with or without a deal – the question of what the voters want to do about Brexit is a key question. However, different people have many different interpretations of what the public actually thinks. The Telegraph claimed earlier this year that “Every region of England and Wales happy to leave the EU without a deal - except London if extension refused”; one prominent Remain campaigner, meanwhile, claimed that Leave voters don’t support No Deal. But what do the numbers say? And what does this tell us about how a potential second EU referendum might go? Let’s take a look.
“Maybe”: would the public vote Leave again?
After the 2016 referendum, pollsters began asking voters how they would vote in a re-run of that “Remain” / “Leave” referendum. They continue to ask this question (which I like to call the “generic” referendum question) today. Sometimes the question varies slightly (YouGov often asks voters whether they think Britain was “right” or “wrong” to vote Leave, which I think counts), but all of the pollsters’ questions amount to the same query – would you support Leave or Remain in a referendum?
The table below shows average of such “generic” referendum polls in each month since January 2016.
As you can see, for the past three years, “Leave” and “Remain” have been stuck in a virtual tie, with each side being within the margin of error of the other. Leave has not led in the polls, on average, in any month since the 2017 general election; but the lead for Remain has been shaky at best, with Remain never polling above 54% (an 8pt lead) and never achieving a double-digit lead. Not even the chaos of March 2019, when we failed to leave the EU on the designated date, shifted the numbers to any great degree; support for remaining in the EU was exactly the same in April (54%) as it was in March (54%).
Of course, those of us who wish to remain in the EU (which includes myself) would take solace from the fact that Remain has been consistently ahead since March 2018. But as I have argued before, it is highly likely that Remain would lose support during a referendum campaign, which means that we would need a significant pre-referendum poll lead to even win by a normal margin when votes are cast. For example, in March 2016, “Remain” was averaging 52% in polls; on 23 June 2016, “Remain” only won 48.1%, a loss of 4 percentage points over the course of 3 months. If that happens again, Remain’s current 6pt lead would no longer exist, and we would lose again.
So, in short, Remain is ahead on the generic referendum question and has been consistently ahead for over a year; but Remain’s lead is narrow and we should avoid taking a “Remain” win for granted.
“Anything goes”: what if the Leave option wasn’t just one vague word? How would the public vote then?
We have plenty of polling about how the public would vote in a re-run of the 2016 referendum, but we have frustratingly little polling about the two scenarios that are actually likely: a referendum where the “Leave” option is May’s Deal, and a referendum where the “Leave” option is No Deal. But in this section, I’ll look at how the public might vote in those hypothetical referenda.
Most of the available polling that offers a specific Leave option looks at support for Theresa May’s Brexit deal, which is still the only Brexit deal that has been negotiated. The table below shows monthly averages of polls that offered the option of “Remain” and May’s Deal.
May’s Deal is thus less popular in practice than the generic concept of “Leave”; polls in July showed Remain 18pts ahead of May’s Deal. This lead has expanded over time; as recently as April, May’s Deal was averaging 45%, just 1pt less than the generic concept of “Leave”. The levels of support have since diverged, however; May’s Deal is now 7pts less popular than “Leave”. One poll from BMG Research showed “Remain” 26pts ahead of May’s Deal when Don’t Knows were excluded.
So what about leaving with No Deal?
As you can see, support for “No Deal” in July (46%) was almost identical to support for a generic “Leave” option (47%). This is a significant change from last year – in October 2018, “No Deal” averaged just 41% in polls compared to 47% for a generic “Leave” option. One poll in July showed “Remain” on 52% and No Deal on 48%.
In short, we don’t have much polling on specific Leave options, but what we do know is that No Deal fares better against “Remain” than May’s Deal does. Hopefully more polling will be conducted on this question soon.
“Happy Times”: what do the public want to do next on Brexit?
The question of what should happen next with Brexit is a rather different question to how people might vote in a hypothetical referendum. After all, some voters might favour Remain but don’t think that reversing Brexit is the right thing to do. So let’s look at voters’ attitudes to possible Brexit outcomes.
Opinium frequently polls voters asking them to choose between 3 options for Brexit:
-> Going ahead with Brexit on the current timelines even if it means leaving with ‘no deal’"
-> Revoking Article 50 and remaining in the European Union
-> Delaying Article 50 until we have a greater idea of what Brexit would get the most support
The table below shows the results of these polls. YouGov also asked a virtually identical question on 1st April, so I have included that in the table as well.
Since the beginning of 2019, support for going ahead with Brexit even if it means leaving with No Deal has risen from 39% (February) to 45% (July). This 6pt gain for “No Deal” has been accompanied by a rise in support for cancelling Article 50 – but only a 2pt rise. Overall, voters have become polarised on the question of what to do next; support for delaying Article 50 has fallen from 20% in February to 13% in July.
However, these polls didn’t include the option of holding a referendum. So let’s look at the recent polls on that question!
The table below shows the average of polls conducted on the question of a second referendum since the start of 2019. I have only included polls that made clear that Remain would be an option on the ballot, as that is the primary demand of the People’s Vote campaign.
Support for a second referendum has begun to rise within the past two months; in July, the average of polls (excluding Don’t Knows) shows that a narrow majority of voters now support holding a second EU referendum.
“Jolly Days”: conclusion
So what can we conclude from this data?
Well, firstly, the polls show that the public has not turned against Brexit to any great extent. Remain leads in generic referendum polls and is ahead of May’s Deal and No Deal. But, with the exception of May’s Deal, the Remain lead remains narrow and precarious. This polarisation is echoed when it comes to the question of whether voters want a second EU referendum; in July, polls showed that voters favour it by 51%-49%; in May, voters were evenly divided on the question. 3 years of Brexit debate has barely shifted public opinion on the question of whether we should or should not leave the EU, and it does not look as if anything will significantly change this deadlock by October 31st.
Secondly, No Deal is more likely to defeat “Remain” in a referendum than May’s Deal. One poll in July even showed “No Deal” on a worryingly high 48% - the same percentage that “Leave” was averaging in polls in March 2016. Remainers cannot afford to be relaxed, as Vince Cable is, about the idea of No Deal being on the ballot in any future referendum. There is a distinct possibility that Remain could lose again, and if No Deal wins, there will be absolutely no hope left for the Remain cause. Remainers should strongly oppose any efforts to place "No Deal" on the ballot of a 2nd referendum.
Finally, all of this data shows that there are no easy or popular answers to the Brexit crisis. The public are evenly divided on the question of whether Brexit is right or wrong, and it is difficult to see how any Brexit outcome could satisfy significant numbers of people on both sides.
There is much to be debated about how we got to this point. Maybe the voters wouldn’t be so polarised if more Remainers had accepted the result; maybe Remainers wouldn’t have been as energised if Leavers had actually tried to include them in the Brexit process; maybe things would be different if a Labour government had won in 2017, as they would have avoided the incompetent shambles that Theresa May produced.
But with the UK just two months away from a No Deal Brexit, it seems to me that it’s impossible to know with any certainty that a particular Brexit position will solve everything or unite the country. All anyone can do right now is advocate for what they think is right in principle - whether that's leaving or remaining.
And as I’ve said before, when it comes to what Labour should do, that means advocating clearly for Remain.
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